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Abstract
It is standardly assumed in discussions of quantum theory that physical systems
can be regarded as having well-defined Hilbert spaces. It is shown here that a Hilbert
space can be consistently partitioned only if its components are assumed not to in-
teract. The assumption that physical systems have well-defined Hilbert spaces is,
therefore, physically unwarranted.
Keywords: Systems, Consistent histories, Mereological partition, Decoherence, Quantum-
to-classical transition
1 Introduction
The term “system” is employed ubiquitously in quantum mechanics. Formally, a system
S is a collection of physical degrees of freedom that can be specified by a Hilbert space
HS. Assuming that it makes sense to talk about the Hilbert space HU of the universe U
as a whole, a system is a component of a Hilbert-space decomposition or tensor-product
structure (TPS) defined on HU, i.e. HU = HS ⊗ HE, where HE is the Hilbert space of a
second system E that is standardly called the “environment” of S. If the notion of HU is
well-defined, then clearly for any two systems S1 and S2, there must exist environments
E1 and E2 for which HS1 ⊗HE1 = HS2 ⊗HE2 = HU.
One can ask, however, whether this formal usage corresponds in a fully-intelligible way to
our informal use of the term “system” to refer to collections of degrees of freedom being
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subjected to analysis in the laboratory, whether these collections of degrees of freedom
describe macroscopic items of apparatus or “isolated” microscopic systems such as pairs of
photons in asymmetric Bell states. In particular, one can ask (1) whether the commonplace
laboratory entities that we informally refer to as “systems” are systems in the strict sense
of being components of well-defined TPSs of HU, and (2) whether such “systems” can be
said to “emerge” from HU by the action of a universal Hamiltonian dynamics HU that
satisfies a Schro¨dinger equation (∂/∂t)|U〉 = −(ı/~)HU|U〉. The non-trivial nature of the
latter question has been highlighted by W. Zurek, who remarks that “it is far from clear
how one can define systems given an overall Hilbert space ‘of everything’ and the total
Hamiltonian” (Zurek (1998) p. 1794) and in later papers offers as “axiom(o)” of quantum
mechanics that “systems exist” (Zurek (2003) p. 746) or “the Universe consists of systems”
(Zurek (2005) p. 2). The first question, however, is generally regarded as unproblematic.
It is answered in the affirmative whenever someone implicitly defines a system S by writing
down an expression such as ‘let |S〉 =
∑
i λi |si〉’ that explicitly defines its state |S〉 in
terms of a collection of Hilbert-space basis vectors |si〉, and then proceeds to investigate
the system so defined experimentally.
Our informal understanding of systems is fundamentally mereological: systems are con-
ceived as being composed of parts, and their degrees of freedom are conceived as derivative
from, or at least emergent from, the degrees of freedom of those parts. Systems are, more-
over, conceived as having boundaries that separate them from other systems. Hence a
magnetic ion trap apparatus, for example, has as identifiable parts a vacuum chamber,
an ion source, pumps, magnets, lasers and detectors; it has a well defined “inside” that
contains the trapped ions and a well-defined “outside” that is exposed to the laboratory
environment, including the experimenters. Ions trapped in the “inside” are explicitly con-
sidered to be distinct systems that can be inserted into, examined within, and extracted
from the ion trap; this distinction is reflected in the formal analysis of data collected from
ion traps (e.g. Brune et al. (1996) where the timecourse of decoherence within an ion trap
is analyzed). What an ion trap apparatus can do - its degrees of freedom - are moreover
conceived as entirely dependent on what its various parts can do; if the ion source stops
working properly, for example, the ion trap apparatus as a whole stops working properly.
One would, therefore, expect that a self-consistent description of such systems could be
provided within the formal framework of mereotopology, i.e. the formal theory of bounded
parts and their containing bounded wholes (Varzi, 1994, 1996; Smith, 1996; Casati and
Varzi, 1999). In particular, one would expect that what are informally regarded as parts
of some system S correspond in an intuitively sensible way to a TPS of HS; that if P1,
P2 ... PN are parts of S, then HS = HP1 ⊗HP2 ⊗ ...⊗HPN. One might even expect, in
the spirit of Zurek’s “axiom(o)”, that a sufficiently detailed dynamical description would,
together with the structure of HU, require a unique mereotopology relating systems to their
included parts, and hence predict the actual, objective existence a unique set of observable
composite objects. The theoretical project of explaining the “emergence of classicality”
from the quantum world (Schlosshauer, 2004, 2007; Landsman, 2007; Wallace, 2008) can
be interpreted as a search for such a unique, dynamically-specified mereotopology.
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It has previously been shown that the dynamics of system-environment decoherence, even
when combined with environmental “witnessing” and encoding of quantum states (Ollivier
et al., 2004, 2005; Blume-Kohout and Zurek, 2006; Zurek, 2009), is insufficient to unam-
biguously specify the boundaries of macroscopic systems that are regarded by observers as
classical (Fields, 2010, 2011). It has also been shown that the ability of observers to ob-
tain classical information about the behavior of collections of quantum degrees of freedom
can be consistently described in a boundary-free and hence mereologically-nihilist frame-
work (Fields, 2012a). These results call the existence of a unique, dynamically-specified
mereotopology of observable systems significantly into question. The present paper shows
that, at least within the “consistent histories” formalism of Griffiths, Omne`s, Gell-Mann and
Hartle (reviewed by Omne`s (1992); Griffiths (2002); see Schlosshauer (2004, 2007) for com-
parison with other approaches), a non-trivial mereotopology of informally-identifiable sys-
tems cannot be defined self-consistently. It shows, in particular, that macroscopic “parts”
of the universe - ordinary things such as laboratory apparatus - cannot be consistently
represented by TPSs of HU. It thus suggests that not only the expectation that a unique
classical world dynamically emerges from quantum theory, but also the expectation that
any classical world dynamically emerges from quantum theory may be misguided.
2 Consistent histories
The formalism of consistent histories developed in Griffiths (2002) Ch. 8 and 10 is employed
here. Consider a Hilbert space H and a von Neumann projection {Πi} defined on H. By
definition, the elements of {Πi} sum to the Identity on H and are mutually orthogonal;
hence each component Πj = |j〉〈j| for some complete, orthonormal basis {|i〉} of H. A
finite sequence of real measurement outcome values α1, α2, ..., αn obtained by acting with
{Πi} at a sequence of distinct times t1, t2, ..., tn can, therefore, be represented as a history
operator Y defined by:
Y (H˘) = (Π1 ⊙ Π2 ⊙ ...⊙ Πn)(H1 ⊙H2 ⊙ ...⊙Hn), (1)
where the index ranges over observation times and as in Eqn. 8.5 of Griffiths (2002) ‘⊙’
represents the tensor product operating on entities indexed to different times and the Hi
are time-indexed copies of H.
If “minimal” quantum mechanics - quantum mechanics with no “collapse of the wave func-
tion” - is assumed as all available experimental evidence indicates it can be (Schlosshauer,
2006), then the underlying physical dynamics described by any such history must satisfy
the Schro¨dinger equation. This is assured by requiring that the physical dynamics separat-
ing any two observation times tj and tk are unitary, i.e. that the time propagation operator
T (tj, tk) is such that:
Πj = T (tj , tk)ΠkT (tk, tj). (2)
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For such histories, the chain operator K as defined by:
K(Πj ⊙ Πk) = ΠkT (tk, tj)Πj (3)
is such that the Born-rule probability W (Y ) of a history Y is given by:
W (Y ) = Tr(K†(Y )K(Y )), (4)
where ‘Tr’ is the operator trace (cf. Griffiths (2002) Eqn. 10.2, 10.3). If the Πi composing
Y are all orthogonal, K(Y ) is the transition amplitude from the initial state of Y to the
final state; W (Y ) is the square of this amplitude.
The superposition principle assures that any final state ψf ∈ H can be reached from any
initial state ψi ∈ H by multiple distinct sequences of physical state transitions. Let Y
µ
and Y ν be histories representing two such sequences; these histories have Born-rule weights
W (Y µ) and W (Y ν) respectively. Consistency requires that the Born-rule weights behave
as classical transition probabilities, i.e. that they be additive. This condition is achieved
provided the histories Y µ and Y ν do not interfere, i.e. provided that:
Tr(K†(Y µ)K(Y ν)) = 0. (5)
Histories from a given ψi to a given ψf that do not interfere are also called “mutually deco-
herent”; a collection of such histories is a framework. Griffiths emphasizes that frameworks,
because they are defined relative to the unitary dynamics represented by the propagators
T (tk, tj), encompass all interactions that affect a system; in particular, the time evolution of
any system S interacting with its environment E can only be consistently described within
a framework encompassing S⊗E (Griffiths (2002) p. 123).
Frameworks based on mutually non-commuting measurement operators, such as position
and momentum, are incompatible; within the consistent-histories formulation of quantum
mechanics, any statements involving conjunctions of outcomes from incompatible frame-
works are regarded as meaningless. For example, it is meaningless to ask of a single particle
traversing a double-slit apparatus both which path it took through the slits and where it
landed on the screen. More generally, any extraction of classical information from a sys-
tem that does not commute with the physical dynamics specified by a given framework is
incompatible with that framework.
3 Mereological partitions
A mereology on some domain D is a formal theory intended to capture the intuitive notion
that some element xj of D can be a part of some other element xk of D, for example,
the intuitive notion that a vacuum chamber or an ion source can be part of an ion-trap
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apparatus. Let ‘xj ≤ xk’ indicate this parthood relation. An extensional mereology is one
in which two entities that share all the same parts are identical. A mereotopology is an
extension of a mereology that formalizes the notions that entities can have interiors and
boundaries, and that entities can be connected to or touching each other (Varzi, 1994, 1996;
Smith, 1996; Casati and Varzi, 1999); a mereotopology enables the formalization of such
statements as “the ion source is within the interior of the vacuum chamber” or “the vacuum
pump is connected to the vacuum chamber.” The notion that entities either have or are
contained within boundaries can itself be extended by formalizing the idea that boundaries
partition the domain D into multiple interiors, with respect to any of which the remainder
of D is exterior. In the notation of Smith and Brogaard (2002), a partition A over D is
a collection of cells that together cover D. Cells may be simple, or may be refined into
collections of sub-cells; ‘zj ≤A zk’ will indicate this sub-cell relation in A. It is explicitly
assumed that the total number of cells in A is finite; hence all refinements are finite and
terminate in simple cells. Intuitively, a partition is overlaid on a domain in the way a
coordinate grid is overlaid on a map: an object x ∈ D may be located in a cell z ∈ A,
in which case we write LA(x, z). If an object is located in multiple cells, extensionality
requires that the cells must overlap:
LA(x, zj) ∧ LA(x, zk)⇒ ∃zi ∈ A such that (zi ≤A zj ∧ zi ≤A zk). (6)
Smith and Brogaard (2002) call (6) the “Principle of Classical Realism” as it forbids the
simultaneous occupation of separate locations by “real” objects.
A partition A is said to recognize an object x that has a location in A:
x ∈ A =def ∃z ∈ A such that LA(x, z). (7)
If A is to preserve the native mereological structure of D - that is, if it to capture the full
parthood structure that D actually displays - it must recognize the parts of a recognized
object x and must, moreover, locate them within a subcell of the location of x:
∀xj , xk ∈ D, [xj ≤ xk ∧ ∃zk ∈ A such that LA(xk, zk)⇒
∃zj ∈ A such that zj ≤A zk ∧ LA(xj , zj)]. (8)
However, if zk is a simple cell of A, in which case zj = zk, A cannot be considered to
recognize xj as distinct from xk; in this case the mereology provided by A is weaker than
the native mereology of D. Let us, therefore, define for x ∈ D and z ∈ A a notion of strong
location with the conditions:
SLA(x, z) =def LA(x, z) ∧ ∀y ∈ D,LA(y , z )⇒ y ≤ x , (9)
and a notion of strong recognition as:
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x ∈S A =def ∃z such that SLA(x, z). (10)
Intuitively, condition (10) requires strongly recognized things to have distinct locations;
if multiple distinct parts of some object x - e.g. multiple atoms - that have equivalent
granularity are located in the same cell of A, they are not distinguishable by their location
and hence are not strongly recognized. A strong partition on D can now be defined as a
partition in which every cell is either empty or strongly locates some object in D. If A
is a strong partition on D, x ∈ D, z ∈ A and SL(x, z), the boundary of z in A can be
regarded as a de facto boundary of x in D, and A can be regarded as providing a complete
mereotopology of D, i.e. one that fully captures both its native mereological properties and
its boundaries. It is this ability to employ strong partitions as mereotopologies on “real”
domains that renders them valuable as formal tools.
The use of strong partitions is commonplace in physics, for example when a volume of
fluid identified by its coordinates in some initial state is tracked through subsequent state
changes by employing the initial-state coordinate “box” as a smoothly-deformable, trans-
parent physical boundary that permits interactions but prevents the flow of matter. Intu-
itively, strong partitions are minimal partitions at a given level of granularity; a non-strong
partition simply adds cells that are superfluous from the point of view of information about
object locations. If a domain D does not admit a strong partition, it does not admit any
partition that is mereologically significant; such domains either contain no objects, or con-
tain objects that can only be organized as sets. In what follows, therefore, all mentioned
partitions will be taken to be strong partitions.
Motivated explicitly by the notion of history defined in §2 above, Smith and Brogaard
(2002) define a history as a time indexed sequence of partitions Ai. Such a history is
consistent in case all of the time-indexed statements Li(xj , zk) describing the locations of
recognized objects are mutually consistent; this will be the case provided they are consistent
for each time ti, i.e. provided no recognized object is required to be in two separated cells
simultaneously. A library of histories is a collection of mutually exclusive histories that
is maximal in the sense that probabilities can be assigned to the histories so as to sum
to unity. This notion of history specifies no requirements regarding the dynamics that
transform a particular statement Li(x, zi) into its successor Li+1(x, zi+1). While Smith
and Brogaard (2002) briefly discuss the formal analogy between histories of partitions and
consistent histories as defined within quantum mechanics and note that quantum systems
“can ... contravene the Principle of Classical Realism as formulated” by (6), they do not
examine the conditions under which quantum systems violate (6) or attempt to overlay a
history of partitions onto unitary dynamics in Hilbert space.
4 Overlaying partitions on Hilbert space
We can now ask: can a history of partitions be overlaid onto Hilbert space, and in particular,
onto the universal Hilbert space HU, in a way that (i) provides a de facto mereotopology
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of “systems” and (ii) satisfies the consistency conditions given by (5)? As a “system” can,
in principle, comprise any collection of physical degrees of freedom, it would appear that
(i) can be satisfied trivially by regarding any system S as defined by the Hilbert space
spanned by the basis vectors of HU corresponding to its particular degrees of freedom.
As noted earlier, this trivial solution for (i) is being employed whenever someone implicitly
specifies a Hilbert space HS by specifying a state |S〉 as a linear combination of basis vectors∑
i λi |si〉. Our question is, therefore, twofold: does the trivial solution to (i) satisfy (5), and
if not, can any physically-reasonable conditions be added to (i) that will make it satisfy (5)?
The first of these questions is easily answered: it is the failure of (i) to assure consistency
that motivates the consistent-histories formulation of quantum mechanics. What must be
added to (i) is known: it is the notion of a framework, with the concomitant rejection as
meaningless of any statements not consistent with the adopted framework. The issue to
be settled, then, is whether (6) can be made compatible with (5) in the context of a fixed
framework.
Recall from §2 that a framework is a collection of mutually-noninterferring histories, and
from (1) that the basic component of a history is the action at some time t of a specific
projector Πj on the Hilbert space HS representing some system S. Any finite physical
implementation of a projection {Πi} has a minimum resolution ǫ below which results cannot
be distinguished; in particular, the numbermǫ of component projectors Πj ∈ {Πi} for which
〈S|Πj |S〉 ≥ ǫ and hence for which the outcome value αj associated with Πj can be recorded
as an observation is finite. At the kth measurement time in a history Y = Π1⊙Π2⊙ ...⊙Πn
indexed by measurement times, therefore, the projector Πk that is included in the history
must be unique, and must be one of the mǫ components of {Πi} for which 〈S|Πj |S〉 ≥ ǫ.
Each time point tk of a history Y can, in other words, be considered as a mapping:
tYk : {Πi} → {1, 2, ...,mǫ} (11)
that selects one of the mǫ possible projectors Πk. This mapping satisfies (6) and is hence
a partition Ak at tk; a sequence of such mappings at a sequence of times is, therefore, a
history of partitions.
The partition expressed by (11) is a partition of the space of possible outcomes, not a
partition of HS as desired. To obtain a partition of HS, note that the images in HS of the
Πj are forced to be distinct by the orthogonality of the Πj . Hence each time point tk of a
history Y can also be regarded as a mapping:
tYk : HS → {1, 2, ...,mǫ} (12)
where here the integers 1, 2, ...mǫ are regarded as indexing the mǫ images of the projectors
that can act on HS at tk. The orthogonality of the Πj assures that this mapping satisfies
(6) and is hence a partition at tk. A time series of such mappings is, therefore, a history of
partitions of HS as desired.
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This procedure is easily extended to a “universe” comprising N non-interacting and hence
mutually separable (i.e. unentangled) “systems” Sµ. In this case Hi = ⊗µHµi and a
projection acting on Sµ can be represented as {Π
µ
j ⊗ (⊗ν 6=µI
ν)} where Iν is the identity
on Hν ; these operators clearly mutually commute. Similarly the propagation operator for
Sµ is T
µ(ti, ti+1)⊗ (⊗ν 6=µI
ν); these operators also mutually commute. Here, as in the case
above, each measurement time tµk selects a unique projector Π
µ
k independently for each of
the component systems. The selected projector indices kµ define mutually-exclusive simple
cells of a partition Ak and a history of partitions can be constructed.
From both mereological and physical perspectives, however, the histories constructed above
are trivial: the partition of HS defined by (12) does not describe a parthood relation,
while its extension to ⊗µHµ specifically disallows physical interactions between the “parts.”
Constructing a mereologically and physically non-trivial history requires relaxing this latter
constraint. Consider, therefore, a universe U characterized by a large number of interacting
degrees of freedom ψ, ϕ, χ, ... and consider a partition Ai at ti of this universe into two
interacting components, a “system” S characterized by more than one degree of freedom and
its environment E as given by the TPSHU = HS⊗HE. A consistent history ..., Aj , Ak, Al, ...
of such partitions that satisfied (6) would confer intuitive “objecthood” on S by sequestering
its degrees of freedom in a sequence of cells ..., zj , zk, zl, ... and hence distinguishing them
from the degrees of freedom of E, which would be contained within cells other than the zi.
Our question becomes, does such a history of (strong) partitions that is consistent in the
sense of satisfying (5) exist?
Approaching this question requires asking how the function SLAi(x, z), the function that
identifies an entity x as being inside a cell z of Ai at ti, is physically implemented. In the
case of interest, “entities” are degrees of freedom and only two cells need be considered: one
corresponding to S and the other to E. That some degree of freedom ϕ is contained within
the cell zS corresponding to S at time ti is an item of classical information. Quantum theory
provides only one way of extracting classical information from quantum degrees of freedom:
action on those degrees of freedom with a projection. Call this projection {ΠAi
S
,ΠAi
E
} at ti,
and the history it induces Y A. From (12), each time point of Y A can be considered as a
mapping:
tY
A
k : HU → {zS, zE} (13)
where for any degree of freedom ϕ of U,
tY
A
k : ϕ 7→ zS or t
Y A
k : ϕ 7→ zE, (14)
but to preserve consistency with (6), no degree of freedom maps to both zS and zE. A
history Y A of (strong) partitions Ai exists for HU just in case a projection satisfying both
both (5) and (14) exists.
Having effectively translated (6) into a constraint on the actions of individual projectors
on individual degrees of freedom, we can now test (5) directly by asking whether histories
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generated by ΠAi
S
and ΠAi
E
acting separately are decoherent, i.e. whether the actions of ΠAi
S
and ΠAi
E
interfere for any chosen degrees of freedom ϕ and χ or whether:
ΠAi
S
ΠAi
E
|ϕχ〉 = ΠAi
E
ΠAi
S
|ϕχ〉. (15)
The condition under which (15) is satisfied is well known: it is the separability condition
|ϕχ〉 = |ϕ〉 ⊗ |χ〉 that assures that the composite state |ϕχ〉 is not entangled. Hence S
can be separated from E by the partition Ai only if none of their respective degrees of
freedom are entangled. This separability condition is satisfied in general, however, only if
none of their respective degrees of freedom interact: any ϕ − χ interaction representable
by a unitary propagator, and hence any interaction that satisfies the Schro¨dinger equation,
will entangle the composite state |ϕχ〉. A universe U can, therefore, be partitioned into
mutually exclusive collections of degrees of freedom describing distinct “objects” S and E
only if these objects do not interact.
This result generalizes from projective measurements of S to generalized measurements that
employ positive operator-valued measures (POVM), collections of positive semi-definite
operators on a Hilbert space H that sum to the identity on H but are not required to be
orthogonal (Nielsen and Chaung, 2000). A POVM {Ei} acting on HS can be represented
as a projection {Πi} acting a notional ancilla with the dimensionality of {Πi} that is
associated withHS. Such an ancilla is a collection of degrees of freedom of E; it is commonly
interpreted as an “apparatus” that interacts with S, the state of which is determined by
the projective measurement {Πi}. The result also generalizes to “mixed” states of S, i.e.
states of an ensemble of copies of s, as it applies to the interaction between each element
of the ensemble and its surrounding environment.
It is often suggested, under the rubric of “the emergence of classicality” (e.g. Schlosshauer
(2004, 2007); Landsman (2007); Wallace (2008); Hartle (2008); Omne`s (2008); Griffiths
(2011)), that system-environment decoherence provides approximate separability between
observable systems that is “good enough” to regard them as partitionable objects. System-
environment decoherence, however, requires system-environment entanglement. Hence ef-
fective separability driven by decoherence fails not because individual “objects” cannot be
separated from each other, but because such “objects” cannot be separated from their mu-
tual environment (cf. Fields (2012b) where this conclusion is reached by different means).
This failure is masked, in most discussions of emergence, by an implicit and a priori as-
sumption that stipulated system-environment boundaries are somehow preserved by the
universal Hamiltonian HU, an assumption for which a physical justification is difficult to
imagine.
5 Conclusion
The assumption that “systems” manipulated in the laboratory have well-defined Hilbert
spaces is convenient, and from the perspective of practical calculations, probably essential.
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It is, therefore, made ubiquitously in discussions of the foundations of quantum mechanics.
Previous work has questioned this assumption from a variety of perspectives (Fields, 2010,
2011, 2012a,b,c). It is shown here that a non-trivial mereological partition can be imposed
on a quantum universe only if that universe is assumed to be free of interactions, i.e. to
be physically trivial. This result provides additional support for the view that “systems”
cannot be regarded as foundational entities in quantum theory.
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